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LEGISLATION OVERLAP: SHOULD THE CLEAN
WATER ACT OR THE FEDERAL INSECTICIDE,
FUNGICIDE AND RODENTICIDE ACT PREVAIL
WHEN PESTICIDES END UP IN U.S. WATERS?
Meghan Rhatigan*
INTRODUCTION
Legislation concerning environmental protection and regulation
of activities that impact the environment has substantially increased
since the 1960s.1 These laws cover subjects ranging from the mainte-
nance of domestic air quality2 to the preservation of U.S. wildlife di-
versity.3  Within this spectrum of protection, Congress passed
substantive amendments to the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Fed-
eral Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). Although
the two statutes' principle objectives differ, potential overlap still ex-
ists. This overlap between the statutes has created some confusion as
to which should prevail when there is a conflict. Such conflicts can
arise when pesticides are applied to combat an insect or pest problem
and the result of the application is incidental contamination of U.S.
waterways.
This Note will explore the relationship of these two statutes and
will argue that FIFRA should be the governing law in cases where pes-
ticides are directed into U.S. waters as a subsidiary effect of a pest
control program. The discussion will focus on a pivotal case, League of
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2005; B.B.A., University
of Notre Dame, 2001. I would like to sincerely thank my family for its endless support
and encouragement and Professor John Copeland Nagle for his helpful insights,
comments, and guidance.
1 See Mitchell F. Crusto, Green Business: Should We Revoke Corporate Charters for En-
vironmental Violations, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10162, 10181 (2004) (noting how a "flood of
federal environmental legislation" followed the creation of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency in 1970).
2 See Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2000).
3 See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
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Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren,4 and guidance issued by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA). 5 Both authorities deal with the
overlap of these two statutes but reach contrary conclusions. Part I
will examine the two relevant statutes in greater detail. Part II will
examine the Forsgren case in detail, and Part III will look closely at the
EPA guidance. Part IV will examine other court decisions and the
works of an organization called the Aquatic Pesticide Coalition that
have dealt with similar concerns. Finally, Part V will outline the argu-
ment that the EPA guidance should prevail over the decision in
Forsgren.
I. THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE FEDERAL INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE
AND RODENTICIDE ACT
A. The Clean Water Act
The Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, commonly
known as the Clean Water Act (CWA), was originally enacted in 1948.6
Since then, the Act has undergone some substantive amendments, in-
cluding those passed in 1972, 7 but its goal has remained the same. Its
stated objective was, and continues to be, to "restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."8
The Act focuses, inter alia, on the discharge of pollutants into waters
of the United States and identifies the elimination of pollution dis-
charges into U.S. waters as a national goal, and the prohibition of
"toxic pollutants in toxic amounts" as a national policy. 9 The CWA
establishes national effluent standards10 to regulate the discharge of
all pollutants into the waters of the United States and it creates excep-
tions for individual discharges under certain circumstances. The
EPA or an authorized state agency regulates individual exceptions
4 309 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2002).
5 Interim Statement and Guidance on Application of Pesticides to Waters of the
United States in Compliance with FIFRA, 68 Fed. Reg. 48,385 (Aug. 13, 2003) [here-
inafter EPA Interim Statement].
6 Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (2000)).
7 See No Spray Coalition Inc. v. City of New York, No. 00 CIV. 5395 (JSM), 2000
WL 1401458, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2000) (noting that the 1972 amendments cre-
ated "the broad regulatory framework that exists today").
8 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000); Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243
F.3d 526, 531 (9th Cir. 2001); GEORGE C. COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, 2 PUBLIC
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § llA:2 (2003).
9 33 U.S.C. §1251 (a).
10 See id. §§ 1312(a), 1374.
11 See id. §§ 1312(b)(2), 1344.
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through the disbursement of National Pollutant Discharge Elimina-
tion System (NPDES) permits. 12 In granting these permits, the au-
thorizing agency will consider local environmental conditions' and
will grant the permit only if the discharge's prospective effect on the
water quality in the area is not too extensive.
A comprehensive understanding of the CWA requires examina-
tion of several important definitional components. Under the Act,
"waters" refers to all navigable waters of the United States.1 4 The Act
defines a "pollutant" as "dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator resi-
due, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, bio-
logical materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded
equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agri-
cultural waste discharged into water.' 5 The CWA also distinguishes
between "nonpoint" and "point" sources of pollution. Nonpoint
sources of pollution arise from "many dispersed activities over large
areas.' 6 The pollution is "not traceable to any single discrete source"
and is therefore "difficult to regulate through individual permits." 1 7
An example of pollution from a nonpoint source is the residue left by
cars on roadways.' 8 Alternatively, point source pollution is
any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but
not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, dis-
crete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding
operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants
are or may be discharged. This term does not include agricultural
stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture. 19
Point source pollution is easier to regulate because its cause is
often easier to identify. Identifying the cause makes it possible to pun-
ish the culprit and this deterrent effect ultimately serves the purpose
of improving water quality. Because of the close relationship between
a point source discharge and its cause, the CWA mandates that point
source polluters obtain permits for such discharges. 20
12 See id. § 1344(e); see also League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d
1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing NPDES permitting and when such permits are
required).
13 See Headwaters, 243 F.3d at 530.
14 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
15 Id. § 1362(6).
16 See League of Wilderness Defenders, 309 F.3d at 1184.
17 Id.
18 See id.
19 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
20 See id. § 1312(b) (2).
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B. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)
was originally enacted in 194721 but underwent significant amend-
ments in 1972, around the same time the Congress considered the
CWA amendments. 22 The purpose of FIFRA was to protect both the
environment and human health from potential harm caused by
pesticides. 23
Under FIFRA, the EPA is charged to consider the effects of pesti-
cides on the environment by determining, among other things,
whether a pesticide "will perform its intended function without unrea-
sonable adverse effects on the environment," and whether "when used
in accordance with widespread and commonly recognized practice
[the pesticide] will not generally cause unreasonable adverse effects
on the environment." 24
To help achieve these objectives, the statute regulates the use and
sales of pesticides. 25 Additionally, FIFRA has established a nationally
uniform pesticide labeling system.26 Under this system, a label indi-
cates that the pesticide has received government approval for speci-
fied uses. 27
C. The Overlap of the CWA and FIFRA
Given the scope of coverage of the CWA and FIFRA, there is po-
tential for overlap between the statutes. A possible conflict arises
when FIFRA-approved pesticides are applied in and around U.S. wa-
ters, thus potentially invoking the jurisdiction of the CWA. Should
21 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163
(1947) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 13 6-1 3 6y (2000)).
22 See No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 00 CIV. 5395 (JSM), 2000
WL 1401458, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2000) (noting that substantive amendments to
the CWA and FIFRA, which created the "broad regulatory framework that exists to-
day," were enacted within three days of each other).
23 Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 531 (9th Cir. 2001).
24 EPA Interim Statement, supra note 5, 68 Fed. Reg. at 48,387 (citing 7 U.S.C.
§ 136a(c)(5) (2000)); see also Headwaters, Inc., 243 F.3d at 530:
The EPA then registers the herbicide if it determines that its composition is
such as to warrant the proposed claims for it, that its labeling complies with
FIFRA requirements, that it will perform its intended function without un-
reasonable adverse effects on the environment, and, when used in accor-
dance with widespread practice, that it will not generally cause unreasonable
adverse effects on the environment.
Id. (quoting Andrus v. AgrEvo USA Co., 178 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 1999)).
25 See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (2000); Headwaters, 243 F.3d at 530.
26 See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(9).
27 See id. § 136a(d).
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such pesticides be considered "pollutants," making them fall within
the ambit of the CWA, or should their FIFRA approval protect them
from such a classification? This potential conflict raises the question
of whether a pesticide that has been applied in compliance with
FIFRA should be subject to regulation and the corresponding permit
requirements under the CWA. The unresolved question has left many
interested groups, from environmentalists to farmers, confused and
uncertain about whether their actions violate federal law.
II. LEAGUE OF WILDERNESS DEFENDERS V. FORSGREN
A. The Facts of the Case
In League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren,28 the plaintiffs, inter-
ested environmental groups, filed suit against the U.S. Forest Service,
claiming that the Forest Service's Douglas Fir Tussock Moth (DFTM)
program violated the CWA.29 More specifically, the plaintiffs claimed
that the Forest Service failed to apply for a NPDES permit30 and that
the Environmental Impact Statement for the project was
inadequate.3 '
The Forest Service's program was aimed at reducing the likeli-
hood of a predicted outbreak of the Tussock Moth, a pest that wreaks
havoc on trees. 32 In its larval stage, the moth eats the needles of live
Douglas Fir and true fir trees, thereby inhibiting their viability. 33 The
moth is a formidable threat to Douglas Fir trees, as was proved in the
1970s when the moth defoliated 700,000 acres of trees in Oregon,
Washington, and Idaho. 34 During that outbreak, there was total mor-
tality in about 17,270 acres and 75% mortality in around 62,070
acres.35 After this severe devastation, the Forest Service developed an
early warning system. 36
28 163 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (D. Or. 2001).
29 See id. at 1230-31.
30 See League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1182 (9th Cir.
2002); League of Wilderness Defenders, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 1230; see also supra note 12 and
accompanying text (discussing NPDES permitting requirements).
31 See League of Wilderness Defenders, 309 F.3d at 1182; League of Wilderness Defenders,
163 F. Supp. 2d at 1230. This second claim is not significant for the purposes of this
Note and, thus, will not be further discussed.
32 See League of Wilderness Defenders, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 1230, 1231.
33 Id. at 1231.
34 See id.
35 Id.
36 See id.
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Outbreaks of the Tussock Moth are cyclical, "with populations in-
creasing to epidemic levels every 7 to 13 years." 37 The Forest Service
can monitor trends in the population of moths, thereby predicting
the next outbreak.38 The outbreaks tend to last for two to four years,
varying in severity. 39 The window for combating these creatures with
pesticides is limited and spraying is only effective in the second year of
the outbreak, between mid-June and mid-July. 40 Because of the early
warning system and careful monitoring of the Tussock Moth popula-
tion, the Forest Service predicted a substantial outbreak in 2000-2002,
which could potentially last until 2004.41 The Forest Service expected
this outbreak to affect 4.2 million acres of forest land.42
There are at least two ways to control a DFTM outbreak. 43 One
alternative is to use B.t.k., a bacterium occurring naturally in the soil
that kills only moths and butterflies. 44 A second alternative is a chemi-
cal called TM-BioControl.45 TM-BioControl is a "viral insecticide that
contains only the natural DFTM virus and ground-up insect parts (in-
fected caterpillars), [which are] mixed primarily with water, molasses,
a sunscreen, and a sticker."46 TM-BioControl kills only DFTM and two
other species of moths. 47
The Forest Service did not want to stop the defoliation entirely.48
Defoliation by moths is a natural process that reduces overstock in the
forest and creates stand openings.49 But, the Forest Service did need
to prevent "unacceptable harm to fish and wildlife habitat or to areas
where people live and work."50 After considering the pros and cons of
the various alternatives, the Forest Service decided to use the TM-Bi-
oControl measure. 5 1
The Forest Service thought that TM-BioControl would protect
specific areas of concern from defoliation. 52 "Areas of concern" are
37 Id.
38 See id.
39 See id.
40 See id.
41 See id.
42 See id. at 1232.
43 See id. at 1231.
44 Id. at 1231-32.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 1232.
47 Id.
48 See id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 See id. at 1233.
52 See id.
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locations "where DFTM defoliation would change or jeopardize vege-
tative conditions in threatened and endangered species habitat,
health and safety areas, campgrounds, or scenic viewsheds, or where
the [Forest Service] had made a substantial investment such as a seed
orchard."5 3 Along with choosing this alternative, the Forest Service
identified ways to mitigate the program's impact on the areas
affected. 54
Local environmental groups resisted the proposed actions of the
Forest Service. 55 The groups were afraid that the program would re-
sult in drift outside of the targeted area and might impact other spe-
cies in the area, such as butterflies and salmon.56  The
environmentalists' administrative appeals imposed an automatic stay
of implementation, but in November 1999, the Forest Service asked
for emergency exemption from the stay.57 The Deputy Chief of the
Forest Service granted the exemption, and the Forest Service sprayed
39,392 acres in June and July 2000.5s Still unsatisfied, environmental
groups presented their claim to the District Court of Oregon. 59
B. The District Court's Decision
After hearing the facts of the case, the district court found no
merit in the environmental groups' claims and awarded summary
judgment to the Forest Service. 60 The court reasoned that the agency
had discretion to rely on studies of its choice.6i The holding recog-
nized that the " [p]laintiffs do not dispute that federal and state regu-
latory agencies have historically not applied the CWA's permit
requirements to the release of pesticides into U.S. waters via atmos-
53 Id.
54 See id. (referring to specific limitations on TM-BioControl's area of application,
the creation of buffer zones, and the implementation of monitoring programs).
55 See id. at 1230. The environmental groups alleged, inter alia, that the pro-
posed action constituted a discharge of "pollutants into the waters of the United
States without a permit" and thus violated the CWA. Id.
56 See League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir.
2002).
57 See League of Wilderness Defenders, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 1234. The Forest Service
feared that delay from the administrative appeals would cause the agency to miss the
limited window of time during which a spraying program is an effective means to
avoid a Tussock Moth outbreak, so the agency sought the emergency exemption. See
id. at 1231, 1234, 1241-42.
58 Id. at 1234.
59 See id. at 1230.
60 See id. at 1243, 1268 (holding that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim
under the CWA).
61 See id. at 1236.
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pheric spraying."62 The plaintiffs argued that the plain language of
the CWA's definition of "point source" demonstrated that the defen-
dant's unpermitted discharge of TM-BioControl violated the CWA,
but the court found this argument unpersuasive. 63 The defendants
argued that the water was never the target of the spraying, 64 not all
sources of water pollution are point sources subject to NPDES require-
ments, and that their activities fell under the silvicultural exemption
of the CWA, and thus did not require a NPDES permit.65 This silvicul-
tural exemption excludes certain activities from NPDES permitting re-
quirements. 66 The Forest Service argued that the exemption defined
silvicultural pest activities as nonpoint sources of pollution and ex-
cluded them from NPDES permit requirements. 67 The court found
the defendants' argument more convincing and concluded that the
activities undertaken by the Forest Service did in fact fall under the
silvicultural exemption because such activities could be classified
within the category of fire and pest control. The court accordingly
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the CWA
violation claim.
68
C. The Ninth Circuit Court's Decision
The environmental groups appealed the district court's decision
and the claim reached the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' docket.69
On appeal, the court overturned the lower court's decision and held
that the Forest Service's activities amounted to point source pollution
62 Id. at 1241.
63 See id. at 1241-43.
64 Id. at 1242.
65 See id.
66 See League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir.
2002):
Silvicultural point source means any discernible, confined and discrete convey-
ance related to rock crushing, gravel washing, log sorting, or log storage
facilities, which are operated in connection with silvicultural activities and
from which pollutants are discharged into waters of the United States. The
term does not include non-point source silvicultural activities such as nurs-
ery operations, site preparation, reforestation and subsequent cultural treat-
ment, thinning, prescribed burning, pest and fire control, harvesting
operations, surface drainage, or road construction and maintenance from
which there is natural runoff.
Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 122.27 (2003)).
67 See League of Wilderness Defenders, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 1242, 1243.
68 See id. at 1243.
69 League of Wilderness Defenders, 309 F.3d at 1181.
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and thus required an NPDES permit. 70 Without such a permit, the
Forest Service was acting in violation of the CWA. The court reasoned
that the pesticides applied to combat the DFTM were pollutants, a fact
that was undisputed by the parties to this case, 71 and such pollutants
were directly sprayed into the water.72
The appellate court did not find the Forest Service's exemption
argument persuasive and could not agree with the defendants that the
aerial spraying of the pesticides should be excluded from NPDES per-
mitting requirements. 73 The court noted that the Forest Service re-
lied on an EPA regulation, two informal letters, and a guidance
document in making its exemption argument, all of which the court
deemed insufficient to warrant an exclusion.74 The court further held
that the silvicultural exemption, which included fire and pest control
activities, applied only to the natural run-off that resulted from the
activities listed. 75 The appeals court reasoned that the exemption re-
lied on the basic distinction between point and nonpoint sources of
pollution. In keeping with another court's decision, 76 the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that pollutants discharged from a plane were point
source discharges, rendering inapplicable the silvicultural activity ex-
emption. 77 Thus, the appeals court held that the application of pesti-
cides from a plane without a NPDES permit, that resulted in
incidental water contamination, amounted to a CWA violation. 78
III. GUIDANCE ISSUED BY THE EPA TO ADDRESS THE APPARENT
CONFLICT BETWEEN THE CWA AND FIFRA
In a 2003 memorandum, the EPA issued an Interim Statement
that delineated the agency's viewpoint as to the CWA's applicability
when FIFRA-approved pesticides are applied to U.S. waters. 79 In issu-
ing this guidance, the EPA declared that such pesticides are not pollu-
70 See id. at 1183, 1192-93.
71 See id. at 1184 n.2 (citing to the definition of "pollutant" under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(6) (1972)).
72 Id. at 1185.
73 See id.
74 See id.
75 Id. at 1186.
76 See id. at 1185 n.4 (citing Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646, 664
(D.P.R. 1979), in which the court held that the " ' release or firing of ordnance from
aircraft into the na-igable waters of [Puerto Rico]' was a point source discharge re-
quiring an NPDES permit").
77 See id. at 1185.
78 See id. at 1190.
79 See EPA Interim Statement, supra note 5, 68 Fed. Reg. at 48,385.
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tants and, by doing so, took a position directly contrary to that chosen
by the Ninth Circuit in Forsgren.
The EPA issued the guidance
in response to a statement by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit in Altman v. Town of Amherst"° that highlighted the
need for EPA to articulate a clear interpretation of whether
[NPDES] permits under... the CWA are required for applications
of pesticides that comply with relevant requirements of FIFRA.8 1
Although the guidance did not describe the agency's final position on
the matter, the statement declared that pesticides applied in compli-
ance with FIFRA requirements are not subject to NDPES permitting.8 2
The EPA reasoned that there are two situations under which ap-
plication of pesticides to U.S. waters does not constitute discharge of a
pollutant: (1) application of pesticides "directly to waters of the
United States" to control pests, such as the larvae of mosquitoes or
aquatic weeds, and (2) application of pesticides to control pests that
are "present over waters of the United States that results in a portion
of the pesticide being deposited to waters of the United States. 8 3 To
illustrate this second situation, the EPA used the example of pesticides
being aerially applied to forest canopy, an example remarkably similar
to the facts of Forsgren.84 Use of this example further shows the direct
contradiction between the EPA's position and that of the Ninth Cir-
cuit. The EPA acknowledged that "[m]any of the pesticide applica-
tions covered by this memorandum are applied either to address
public health concerns such as controlling mosquitos or to address
natural resource needs such as controlling non-native species or plant
matter growth that upsets a sustainable ecosystem. '85
In the Interim Statement, the EPA considered previous court de-
cisions, including the decision in Headwaters, Inc v. Talent Irrigation
District.8 6 In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that herbicide users
were required to obtain a NPDES permit.8 7 The EPA had filed an
amicus brief in that case which noted that "compliance with FIFRA
80 See discussion infra notes 131-43 and accompanying text.
81 See EPA Interim Statement, supra note 5, 68 Fed. Reg. at 48,387.
82 See id. It is worth noting that the EPA did acknowledge that states and Indian
tribes may impose additional regulation of pesticides to address water quality issues.
See id.
83 Id. at 48,385.
84 See id.
85 Id. at 48,387.
86 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001); see discussion infra notes 112-30 and accompany-
ing text.
87 EPA Interim Statement, supra note 5, 68 Fed. Reg. at 48,387.
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did not necessarily mean compliance with the [CWA] ."88 Although
this brief probably played a role in the court's decision, such reliance
may have been misplaced because the brief "did not address the ques-
tion of how pesticide application is regulated under the [CWA] or the
circumstances in which pesticides are 'pollutants' under the CWA." 89
In its interim statement, the EPA recognized that the Headwaters deci-
sion led to confusion among public health authorities, natural re-
source managers, and others who rely on pesticides. 90 Many of those
who deal with pesticides on a day-to-day basis were concerned because
they could not tell if they had a legal obligation to get a NPDES per-
mit when applying pesticides approved under FIFRA.91
This uncertainty caused the Second Circuit to remand the Altman
case for further consideration and gave the EPA incentive to issue this
guidance. 92 In concluding that the CWA does not require NPDES
permits for a pesticide applied according to relevant FIFRA require-
ments, the EPA explained that this interpretation is consistent with
the circumstances before the Ninth Circuit in Headwaters and with the
amicus brief filed by the federal government in the Altman case.9 3
The EPA conducted a step-by-step analysis to explain how it
reached its conclusion:
Under FIFRA, [the] EPA is charged to consider the effects of pesti-
cides on the environment by determining, among other things,
whether a pesticide "will perform its intended function without un-
reasonable adverse effects on the environment," and whether "when
used in accordance with widespread and commonly recognized
practice [the pesticide] will not generally cause unreasonable ad-
verse effects on the environment."94
The EPA guidance dictates that "[tihe application of a pesticide
to waters of the U.S. would require an NPDES permit only if it consti-
tutes the 'discharge of a pollutant' within the meaning of the Clean
Water Act."'95 The EPA concluded that pesticides applied consistently
with FIFRA do not fall within any of the terms of section 1362(6) of
the CWA, which defines the term "pollutant. '96 The EPA paid special
88 Id. at 48,387 n.1.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 48,387.
91 Id.
92 See Altman v. Town of Amherst, 47 Fed. Appx. 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2002); EPA
Interim Statement, supra note 5, 68 Fed. Reg. at 48,387.
93 EPA Interim Statement, supra note 5, 68 Fed..Reg. at 48,387.
94 Id. (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5) (2000)).
95 Id.
96 See id.
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attention to whether such pesticides could be characterized as "chemi-
cal wastes" or "biological materials" but determined that such classifi-
cations were not applicable. 9 7 The agency reasoned that pesticides
are not waste and therefore cannot be considered "chemical wastes."
98
The EPA looked to definitions of "waste" but found that waste was an
inapposite term.99 "Waste" connotes material that has no use.' 0 0 Pes-
ticides, however, are useful.' 0 ' "[T]hey are EPA-evaluated products
designed, purchased and applied to perform their intended purpose
of controlling target organisms in the environment. " 10 2 Such pesti-
cides could be considered waste if they were found in storm water and
were no longer performing a useful function.'
0 3
The EPA conducted a similar analysis to determine whether pesti-
cides could be characterized as "biological materials." 10 4 Again, the
EPA concluded that such a classification was not deserved. 10 5 The
agency reasoned that Congress did not intend to include all things
with biological components in this category.10 6 If the legislators had
intended such a result, then even activities such as fishing with bait
would require a permit. 10 7 The EPA further reasoned that it would be
absurd to treat biological pesticides as pollutants when chemical pesti-
cides are not so treated. Disparate treatment of chemical and biologi-
cal pesticides is not warranted because biological pesticides would
tend to have fewer adverse effects on the environment than chemical
pesticides. 10 8 Additionally, case law suggests that Congress intended
for this category to include only waste material of human or industrial
processes. '0 9
97 See id. at 48,387-88.
98 See id. at 48,388.
99 See id.
100 See id.
101 See id.
102 Id.
103 See id. at 48,388 n.4.
104 Id. at 48,388.
105 See id.
106 See id.
107 See id. at 48,388 n.5.
108 See id. at 48,388.
109 See id. (citing Ass'n to Protect Hammersley, Eld & Totten Inlets v. Taylor Res.,
299 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002)). Association to Protect Hammersley held that "bio-
logical materials" were limited to waste from human processes, and as such, the mus-
sel shells and feces did not fall within this category of pollutant because those
materials resulted purely from the biological processes of the mussels. Hammersley,
299 F.3d at 1016; see COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 8.
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"Under EPA's interpretation, whether a pesticide is a pollutant
under the CWA turns on the manner in which it [is] used, i.e.,
whether its use complies with all relevant requirements of FIFRA."' 110
This interpretation seeks to harmonize the CWA and FIFRA, and al-
lows individuals who deal with pesticides to do so with certainty, know-
ing that if they act in compliance with FIFRA, they will not have to
deal with permitting requirements under the CWA.111
IV. LOWER COURTS LEFr WITH LiTTLE GUIDANCE-CONFUSION AND
UNREST ENSUES
Forsgren is not the only case dealing with the overlap of FIFRA
and the CWA. In hearing other cases, the Ninth Circuit and other
courts have had the opportunity to wrestle with the complicated issues
presented by the overlap of these two statutes. The results have va-
ried, and the courts do not seem to agree on the proper way to handle
such concerns.
A. Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation District
Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation District is another Ninth Circuit
case. 112 In that case, environmental groups brought a suit against the
irrigation district claiming that the irrigation district violated the CWA
by failing to obtain a NPDES permit to apply herbicide to irrigation
canals.113 The irrigation district applied the herbicide, MAGNACIDE
H, to canals to control the growth of weeds and vegetation. 1 14
MAGNACIDE H is an approved herbicide under FIFRA, yet it needs
to be used carefully because it is toxic to fish.11 5 As such, its appropri-
ate uses have been designated.1 16 The district court found in favor of
110 EPA Interim Statement, supra note 5, 68 Fed. Reg. at 48,388.
111 See id.
112 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001).
113 Id. at 528.
114 Id.
115 See id. MAGNACIDE H is registered under FIFRA and bears an EPA-approved
label. This label warns about the potential lethal effects of the chemical but does not
state that a NPDES permit is required for its use. See id. at 529; Kathy S. Hamel, The
Impact of the Talent Irrigation District Court Decision on Aquatic Pesticide Regulation in Wash-
ington State, AQUAPHYrE ONLINE, Winter 2001, at http://aquatl.ifas.ufl.edu/aq-wOI-
5.html.
116 See BAKER PETROLITE CORP., MAGNACIDE H HERBICIDE APPLICATION AND
SAFETY MANuAL app. D, at 25 (2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppfeadl/en
danger/effects/magnacide-safety-manual.pdf (showing the MAGNACIDE H govern-
ment-approved label).
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the defendants, holding that the herbicide's FIFRA approval obviated
the need to obtain a permit.1 17
Recognizing the overlap of FIFRA and the CWA in this case, the
appeals court sought to determine whether the FIFRA label should
control whether a permit is required under the CWA.1 18 The Ninth
Circuit sought "'to give effect to each [statute] if [it could] do so
while preserving their sense and purpose. When two statutes are capa-
ble of coexistence, it is the duty of the courts . . . to regard each as
effective."" 19 The court considered the purposes and goals of the two
statutes 120 and heavily relied on an amicus brief filed by the EPA in
the case.121 The Ninth Circuit recognized that the opinion of the
agency is entitled to some deference.' 22 The court emphasized the
fact that the CWA did consider local environmental conditions while
FIFRA did not.123 The Ninth Circuit held that the "herbicide's com-
pliance with [FIFRA] registration and labeling requirements did not
absolve the district from its obligation to obtain [a] NPDES per-
117 Headwaters, 243 F.3d at 529.
118 Id. at 528.
119 Id. at 530-31 (quoting Res. Inv., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 151 F.3d
1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 1998)).
120 See id. at 529; id. at 532 ("'FIFRA registration is a cost-benefit analysis that no
unreasonable risk exists to man or the environment taking into account the eco-
nomic, social and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide."')
(quoting Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1248 (9th Cir. 1984)); id. ("In
contrast, the granting of a NPDES permit under the CWA is not based on cost-benefit
analysis, but rather on determination that discharge of pollutant satisfies the EPA's
effluent limitations, imposed to protect water quality.") (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)
(2000)); supra note 88 and accompanying text.
121 See Headwaters, 243 F.3d at 531:
In approving the registration of th[e] pesticide, EPA concluded that the
overall economic benefits of allowing the use of the product outweigh ad-
verse environmental effects. EPA did not analyze, was not required to ana-
lyze, and could not feasibly have analyzed, whether, or under what
conditions, the product could be discharged from a point source into partic-
ular public water bodies in compliance with the CWA. In approving the
registration of [MAGNACIDE] H, EPA did not warrant that a user's compli-
ance with the pesticide label instructions would satisfy all other federal envi-
ronmental laws. Indeed, EPA approves pesticides under FIFRA with the
knowledge that pesticides containing pollutants may be discharged from
point sources into navigable waters only pursuant to a properly issued CWA
permit.
Id. (quoting Amicus Curiae Brief of the United States at 12, Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent
Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-35373)).
122 Id. at 531.
123 See id. at 530.
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mit. ' 124 The court reasoned that even if MAGNACIDE H is used in
compliance with the FIFRA label, it "may have effects that depend on
local environmental conditions." 2 5 Based on this reasoning, the
court decided that "FIFRA does not preempt [the] entire field of pes-
ticide regulation, but instead leaves room for local ordinances requir-
ing [a] permit before pesticide use. 126
The defendants in the Headwaters case also argued that MAGNA-
CIDE H was not a chemical waste and therefore not within the defini-
tion of "pollutant"12 7 under the CWA.1 2 8 They maintained that
MAGNACIDE H was a chemical, but not waste.1 29 The Ninth Circuit
implied that the position of the district court was ridiculous but re-
fused to decide the issue, finding that, at the very least, the residue left
after the application of the chemical qualified as chemical waste.' 30
Thus, the residue could be considered a pollutant.
B. Altman v. Town of Amherst
The Second Circuit has also had the opportunity to hear a case
dealing with the overlap of FIFRA and the CWA. In Altman v. Town of
Amherst,1 31 the town residents claimed that the town violated the CWA
by spraying for mosquitoes in wetland areas without a NPDES per-
mit.1 32 The defendants argued that the pesticides were being used for
a beneficial and useful purpose and, therefore, should not be consid-
ered pollutants. 3 3 The plaintiffs challenged that contention with the
support of several cases. 134 The district court concluded that "'pesti-
124 Id. at 527. The position taken by the court is not unsupported. See id. at 532
("[A] label's failure to include the possible need for a NPDES permit 'does not re-
lieve a producer or user of such products from the requirements of the Clean Water
Act.'") (quoting U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Pesticide Regulation Notice 95-1 (May 1,
1995)).
125 Id. at 531.
126 Id. (citing Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 614 (1991)).
127 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
128 See Headwaters, 243 F.3d at 532.
129 See id.
130 Id. at 532-33 (citing Hudson River Fishermen's Ass'n v. City of New York, 751
F. Supp. 1088, 1101-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 940 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1991)).
131 47 Fed. Appx. 62 (2d Cir. 2002).
132 Id. at 63; Altman v. Town of Amherst, 190 F. Supp. 2d 467, 467 (W.D.N.Y.
2001).
133 See Altman, 47 Fed. Appx. at 64; Altman, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 468.
134 See Altman, 47 Fed. Appx. at 64-65 (citing Headwaters, 243 F.3d at 526; United
States v. Schallom, 998 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1993); Hudson River Fishermen's Ass'n v.
City of New York, 751 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 940 F.2d 649 (2d Cir.
1991)).
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cides, when used for their intended purpose, do not constitute a 'pol-
lutant' for purposes of the . . . [CWA,] and are more appropriately
regulated under [FIFRA].'"135 In Altman, the EPA submitted a letter
for the town admitting that the agency had no specific policy on the
pesticide question, and noted that the EPA had never issued a NPDES
permit for such activities in the past, nor had it sought to compel
states to do so. 136 The district court concluded that the defendants'
pesticide program is more appropriately regulated under FIFRA, not-
ing that court research "'has uncovered no reported cases in which
the use of pesticides, in the manner for which they were intended,
were found to be 'pollutants' requiring a NPDES... permit under the
Clean Water Act.'" 137
On appeal, the plaintiffs maintained that FIFRA does not pre-
empt or foreclose the permit requirements of the CWA and claimed
that the defendants' deliberate, good faith application of pesticides
for their intended use does not render them something other than a
"pollutant" within the meaning of the CWA.13 8 The Second Circuit
held that the district court had acted on an incomplete record, 39 and
had unnecessarily curtailed the plaintiffs' discovery. 140 As such, the
court of appeals remanded the case so that adequate discovery could
take place. 141 The Second Circuit also noted that
[u] ntil the EPA articulates a clear interpretation of current law-
among other things, whether properly used pesticides released into
or over waters of the United States can trigger the requirement for
NPDES permits... -the question of whether properly used pesti-
cides can become pollutants that violate the CWA will remain
open.142
The court made an express plea to the EPA and said that "articulation
of the EPA's interpretation of the law in this situation would be of
great assistance to the courts."'1 43
135 Altman, 47 Fed. Appx. at 63 (quoting Altman, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 471); see also
Altman, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 470 (asserting that "spray drift from a pesticide used for its
intended purpose is [not] a chemical waste within the meaning of the Clean Water
Act").
136 See Altman, 47 Fed. Appx. at 64-65; Altman, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 468-69.
137 Altman, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 470.
138 Altman, 47 Fed. Appx. at 66.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 See id.
142 Id. at 67.
143 Id. The EPA responded to this plea with the guidance they issued. See supra
notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
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C. No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New York
There have been a series of cases brought by environmental
groups challenging the City of New York's use of pesticides to combat
the mosquito population. Such groups have claimed CWA violations
on the theory that the spray finds its way into the waters around the
city.
1. No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New York-Round One
The first of these cases was No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New
York. 144 Like many other cities across the country, New York at-
tempted to reduce the mosquito population in response to the con-
cern over the West Nile Virus. 1 45 Although the city contended that
the spraying program was in the best interests of preserving the public
health, the plaintiffs argued that it posed "a substantial danger to
human health and to the environment."'1 46 The district court held
that the most applicable statute to the case was FIFRA. 147
The court determined that under FIFRA a pesticide can only be
registered if it will perform its intended function without unreasona-
ble adverse effects on the environment and, when used in accordance
with widespread and commonly recognized practice, it will not gener-
ally cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.1 48 In this
case, the products used by the city were approved by the EPA for ae-
rial and ground spraying. 149 The court concluded that the plaintiffs'
attempts to use alleged violations of FIFRA-a statute which does not
have a provision for civil redress 1 50 -as violations of the CWA-a stat-
ute that does allow private citizens to allege violations 151 -
"stretche [d] the language of the [CWA] beyond its reasonable mean-
ing and result[ed] in a conflict with the apparent purpose of Congress
to leave the regulation of the use of pesticides to the EPA and the
Attorney General under FIFRA."' 52 The court noted that drift "is the
natural consequence of the use of pesticides for the very purpose for
144 No. 00 CIV. 5395 (JSM), 2000 WL 1401458 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2000).
145 See id. at *1.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 See id.
149 Id.
150 See id. at *2-3.
151 Id. at *2.
152 Id. (paraphrasing the holding of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Chemical
Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. Department of the Army, 111 F.3d 1485 (10th Cir. 1997),
in declining to construe provisions of the CWA in the broad manner proposed by the
plaintiffs while noting that the plaintiffs interpretation of the CWA was inconsistent
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which they were approved by the EPA"1 5 3 and, because of the broad
meaning of "waters" under the CWA, "any approved use of the pesti-
cide, other than in a desert, [would] inevitably result in a drift of the
spray into navigable waters." 154
The district court gave credence to the fact that amdendments to
FIFRA and the CWA were enacted within three days of one another in
1972.155
The fact that these two regulatory schemes were before Congress at
the same time establishes beyond doubt that when Congress made a
deliberate decision not to provide a private right of action under
FIFRA, it did not intend to permit private parties to circumvent that
decision through an action under the Clean Water Act. 156
The court reasoned that Congress dictated the appropriate remedies
in the statutes and the court should be wary of reading additional
remedies into them. 157 The court noted that use of a pesticide be-
yond its well intended use may result in a CWA violation, but here, the
pesticide use was within the category of approved uses.' 5 8 As such, the
court concluded that "Congress intended to leave it to the EPA and
the Attorney General to determine whether there has been compli-
ance with the technical requirements of the label." 159
The district court found for the City of New York. 160 The court
held that the cases the plaintiffs relied upon were insufficient because
they all involved direct discharges into navigable waters. 161 The pro-
gram contested in this case purposefully attempted to avoid spraying
with congressional intent, would lead to irrational results, and would create a conflict
between the CWA and FIFRA).
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 See id. at *3 (citing Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981)).
158 See id. The court noted that violations would be possible if the pesticides were
used beyond their intended uses. For instance, if a pilot of a plane that had been
spraying insecticides dumped what remained in the tank into a nearby river, his ac-
tions could be a violation. See id.
159 Id.
160 See id. at *4.
161 See id. at *3. The court noted further that the trucks in this case were discharg-
ing the spray into the air and not into the water. Id. The court reasoned that Con-
gress could not have meant to cover this incidental drift. Id. "The fact that a
pollutant might ultimately end up in navigable waters as it courses through the envi-
ronment does not make its use a violation of the [CWA]." Id. If that were the case,
then "every emission of smoke, exhaust fumes, or pesticides in New York City" would
come under the purview of the CWA. Id.
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into the water. The court said it would leave the question of direct
spray to another day, as well as the question of whether pesticides
used in an approved way can constitute waste.' 62
2. No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New York-Round Two
The plaintiffs of the first case appealed the district court's deci-
sion to the Second Circuit.163 In this appeal, the plaintiffs claimed,
inter alia, that the spraying of pesticides at issue constituted a "'dispo-
sal' of 'solid waste' in a manner that rendered it 'discarded material'
causing 'imminent and substantial endangerment' to people."' 64 The
court held that the district court had not abused its discretion and
found that material "is not discarded until after it has served its in-
tended purpose."' 65 The Second Circuit also concluded that the
plaintiffs were trying to stretch statutory language that did permit pri-
vate rights of action 166 to cover conduct that is more aptly covered by
FIFRA. 167
3. No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New York-Round Three
No Spray Coalition initiated another suit against the City of New
York in 2002.168 Once again, the environmental group sought to en-
join the city's mosquito spraying program designed to combat the
West Nile Virus. 169 The court in the first No Spray Coalition case 170 said
it left the question whether direct spray into the water could amount
to a CWA violation to another day. 171 In this case, the court was
forced to address that very issue. The insecticides being used in this
No Spray Coalition case had labels that said they were to be used in
162 Id. at *4.
163 No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New York, 252 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2001).
164 Id. at 149.
165 Id. at 150 (citing Connecticut Coastal Fisherman's Ass'n v. Remington Arms
Co., 989 F.2d 1305, 1316 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Fed Court Denies Injunction in N.Y.
Insecticide Case, 18 No. 12 Andrews Toxic Chem. Litig. Rep. 9 (2000) (discussing the
holding in No Spray Coalition).
166 See No Spray Coalition, 252 F.3d at 150. In this No Spray Coalition, the environ-
mental group brought an action under the Resource Conservation Recovery Act
(RCWA). Id. at 149. The RCWA also has a citizen suit provision, like the CWA. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 6872(a) (1) (A)-(B) (2000).
167 No Spray Coalition, 252 F.3d at 149.
168 No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of NewYork, No. 00 CIV. 5395 (JSM), 2002 WL
31682387 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2002).
169 Id. at *1.
170 See No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 00 CIV. 5395 (JSM), 2000
WL 1401458 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2000); discussion supra notes 144-62.
171 See No Spray Coalition, 2000 WL 1401458 at *4.
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"residential and recreational areas where adult mosquitoes are pre-
sent . . . surrounding parks, woodlands, swamps, [and] marshes."1 7 2
Because the labels said these insecticides were approved for swamps
and marshes, the court concluded that the EPA clearly anticipated
their use over protected waters. 173 The court held that a minor
amount of "spraying of insecticides directly over the rivers, bays,
sound, and ocean surrounding New York City as part of the preven-
tion program" did not violate the CWA. 174
4. No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New York-Round Four
Unsatisfied with the results from the district court, No Spray Coa-
lition subsequently appealed to the Second Circuit.175 In reviewing
the record before it, the Second Circuit concluded that a citizen suit
brought under the CWA and based on the application of a FIFRA-
regulated chemical could proceed even if the pesticide application at
issue was performed in compliance with FIFRA.176 The court dis-
agreed with the interpretation by the district court and insisted that
Congress intended the CWA's citizen suit provision to operate inde-
pendently of FIFRA and that it should not be necessary for an alleged
violation of the CWA to also constitute a FIFRA violation. 177 In com-
menting on the district court's attempt to address the question of
whether FIFRA-approved pesticides could violate the CWA, the Sec-
ond Circuit concluded that the lower court had failed to answer this
question. I78 As such, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded the
case back to the district court. 179
172 No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 00 CIV. 5395 (JSM), 2002 WL
31682387, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2002).
173 Id. at *2.
174 Id. at *1.
175 No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New York, 351 F.3d 602 (2d Cir. 2003).
176 See id. at 603.
177 See id. at 605. The Second Circuit disagreed with the district court's view that
the CWA's citizen suit provision "becomes inoperative where the alleged violation of
CWA lies in the use of pesticides covered by FIFRA in a manner that is not a substan-
tial violation of FIFRA." Id. at 606.
178 See id. at 606.
179 Id.
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D. The Development of the Aquatic Pesticide Coalition
Further evidence of the uncertainty felt surrounding the Forsgren
decision is the creation of the Aquatic Pesticide Coalition (APC). 180
The APC was formed by a group of concerned pesticide users, a group
that included agricultural producers, irrigation district managers,
aquatic pesticide manufacturers, mosquito control interests, and com-
panies in the lake management industry. 8" Its members claim that
the group was formed in response to the Forsgren decision, which, ac-
cording to the APC, paralyzed necessary plant management opera-
tions in the western United States. 182 The APC argues the impact of
requiring NPDES permits might actually have the "perverse effect of
impairing water quality through the negative consequences of aquatic
invasive plant infestations."' 83 Because of the Forsgren decision, some
groups have stopped treatments that they used to engage in, resulting
in some significant costs. For instance, because it was uncertain
whether an NPDES permit would be required,1 8 4 the town of Stow,
Massachusetts decided to halt major aquatic plant control treatment
in its Lake Boon, making the lake less suitable for swimming and
other recreational activities. Additionally, oyster growers in Washing-
ton chose not to treat their beds as they normally would after they
were threatened with a third-party lawsuit because they did not have a
NPDES permit.1 85 As a result of the lack of treatment, the oyster
growers lost some of their beds.18 6 Such costs would not have to be
incurred if pesticide and herbicide users knew, with certainty, that
NPDES permits were not required.
V. THE EPA REACHED THE CORRECT DECISION AND FORSGREN
SHOULD BE OVERRULED
As the cases above indicate, the law on the overlap of the CWA
and FIFRA is far from settled. Because of this uncertainty, some au-
thority must clearly articulate the state of the law. Whether such gui-
180 See Karen L. Werner, Pesticides: FIFRA Amendment Could be Option to Address
Clean WaterAct Permit Issues, 88 Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at A30 (May 7, 2003);
Hamel, supra note 115.
181 See Hamel, supra note 115.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 SePro, Clean Water Act NPDES Permits for Aquatic Pesticide Use-The 'Talent"
Case, 2 ECURRENTs 2 (June 2002), at http://www.sepro.com/aquatics/e-currents/
ecurrents-june_2002.htm.
185 See Hamel, supra note 115.
186 See id.
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dance comes from the Supreme Court, Congress, or the EPA, 187 there
needs to be some affirmative action taken to ensure that the users of
pesticides know whether they need to obtain NPDES permits before
applying their pesticides. The action taken must effectively overrule
the Forsgren decision and confirm that NPDES permits are not re-
quired for pesticides applied in compliance with FIFRA.
A. The Costs Associated with NPDES Permits
The Forsgren decision has created an unacceptable degree of un-
certainty for those who use pesticides and for those who regulate the
use of pesticides. An affirmative stance needs to be taken to address
this uncertainty, and because of the costs associated with NPDES per-
mitting, that stance should be to effectively overturn the Forsgren
holding.
Pesticides are needed to combat all sorts of threats to human
health and safety.18 The broad implications of the Forsgren decision
could affect activities ranging from disease prevention to forest fire
prevention.' 8 9 Many of these activities are often time-sensitive and
should not be subject to delay due to the need of obtaining a NPDES
permit to avoid CWA violations. "Emergencies with pests may prompt
the need to spray to prevent public health problems," and as Stephan
Johnson, the EPA's Assistant Administrator for Prevention, Pesticides,
and Toxics, said "[t]he last thing I want is for those uses to be stopped
because an NPDES permit must be obtained."'190 As it is, when decid-
ing whether to register a pesticide under FIFRA, the EPA goes to great
lengths to consider potential adverse effects on the aquatic environ-
ment. 91 Any use restrictions will be noted on the label. 192 Thus, pes-
ticides used in compliance with their FIFRA registration should not be
subject to violations of the CWA. The time lost during the application
process and negotiation phase could be substantial, not to mention
the financial impact of NPDES permitting.
NPDES permits are issued for and tailored to unique circum-
stances, so the process of applying for one can involve extensive nego-
tiation between the issuing agency and the individual or group
187 See Werner, supra note 178 (noting that the three options available to address
this issue are an appeal of Forsgren to the Supreme Court, a legislative fix, or an EPA
rulemaking).
188 See Pat Phibbs, Pesticides: EPA to Soon Issue Interim Guidance on Water Act Permits
for Aquatic Use, 119 Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at A35 (June 20, 2003).
189 See id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.
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seeking the permit. The permit will have to identify the specific area
to be covered by the permit, delineate all of the activities that will be
covered, specify discharge limitations and monitoring requirements,
and list reporting and recordkeeping requirements. 193 If any changes
need to be made to these specifications, it is likely that this negotia-
tion phase would have to be repeated, and there is no guarantee that
the issuing agency will approve such changes. 194 Such negotiations
take time and money and are an unnecessary burden for those who
are using pesticides in compliance with FIFRA.
The actual fees associated with NPDES permitting are established
on a state-by-state basis and can be quite substantial. 195 "It is very
clear . .. that there is a very large range of NPDES permit fees be-
tween the states."'91 6 In general, the fees will vary depending on the
type and extent of the activity to be undertaken.1 97 The state can
structure its permitting program so that it could either be a "minor
cost of doing business [or] a major impediment [to] doing business in
the state."' 98 The bottom line, however, is that NPDES permits are
not free.199 To make matters worse, such fees are generally not in-
curred only once.200 Many states impose NPDES permitting fees on
an annual basis. 20' Additionally, a permitee usually has no guarantee
193 See WASH. STATE DEP'T OF ECOLOGY, AQUATIC MOSQUITO CONTROL NATIONAL
POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM WASTE DISCHARGE GENERAL PERMIT 2
(2002), available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wq/pesticides/final-pesticide-
permits/mosquito/mosquito-permitaprillO.pdf.
194 Additionally, the permit will have to be renewed, and possibly renegotiated, at
the end of its period. Some states require the reapplication process to begin as early
as six to nine months before expiration. See RUSSELL J. HARDING, AN ANALYSIS OF
STATES WATER DISCHARGE FEES AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO MICHIGAN BUSINESSES 3
(2003), available at http://www.michamber.com/chamnews/WaterFeesRec.pdf;
WASH. STATE DEP'T OF ECOLOGY, supra note 193, at 16.
195 The fees need to cover everything from the costs of processing the applications
and conducting inspections to ensure compliance to the costs of laboratory analysis of
samples and overhead. See WASH. STATE DEP'T OF ECOLOGY, WASTEWATER/STORM-
WATER DISCHARGE PERMIT FEES (2003), available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/
wq/permits/permit fees/index.htm.
196 HARDING, supra note 194, at 2.
197 The fees within a state can vary substantially. In Colorado, for instance, fees
for NPDES permits range from $150 to $17,926. Id. at 3. Indiana's fees also encom-
pass a large range, $400 to $34,300. Id. Wisconsin's fees seem to top the chart, rang-
ing from $250 to $1,192,000. Id.
198 Id. at 2.
199 Hamel, supra note 115.
200 See HARDING, supa note 194, at 3.
201 Id.
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that the permit will not be revoked by the issuing agency 20 2 or re-
newed at the end of the period, thus subjecting the permitee to end-
less uncertainty. Pesticide users, who are oftentimes performing
valuable services for the human population, such as providing irriga-
tion for crops and preventing disease, should not be subject to such
burdens.
B. FIFRA Can Protect the Environment and Deal with Violators
Pesticides will only be approved under FIFRA if they do not pose
"unreasonable adverse effects" to the environment. 203 The EPA con-
siders the intended function of the pesticide and the common ways in
which it is used in making this determination. 20 4 Approval will only
be granted if the effects are reasonable, and, if conditions should
change, the EPA has reserved the right to "suspend, cancel, or restrict
the use of a pesticide that poses unreasonable adverse effects or immi-
nent hazards to the environment."20 5 Thus, FIFRA gives the EPA the
necessary flexibility to contend with changing environmental condi-
tions and needs. If a particular pesticide poses a potentially larger
threat to the environment, the EPA can label it as "restricted." By
doing so, the EPA will require that the pesticide be applied by a certi-
fied user,20 6 thereby increasing the likelihood that the pesticide will
be applied with minimal adverse effects on the environment. The
FIFRA-approved label will include appropriate uses of the pesticide
202 Permits can be revoked for any one of a number of reasons. See WASH. STATE
DEP'T OF ECOLOGY, supra note 193, at 12-13 (listing, among others, "a change in any
condition that requires ... [a] reduction or elimination of the permitted discharge"
and a "determination that the permitted activity endangers human health or the envi-
ronment" as reasons for revoking a permit).
203 EPA Interim Statement, supra note 5, 68 Fed. Reg. at 48,387 (citing 7 U.S.C.
§ 136a(c) (5) (2000)); see also Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526,
530 (9th Cir. 2001):
The EPA then registers the herbicide if it determines that its composition is
such as to warrant the proposed claims for it, that its labeling complies with
FIFRA requirements, that it will perform its intended function without un-
reasonable adverse effects on the environment, and, when used in accor-
dance with widespread practice, that it will not generally cause unreasonable
adverse effects on the environment.
Id. (quoting Andrus v. AgrEvo USA Co., 178 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 1999)).
204 See EPA Interim Statement, supra note 5, 68 Fed. Reg. at 48,387 (citing 7
U.S.C. § 136a(c) (5) (2000)).
205 SANNE KNUDSON, QUICK REFERENCE: FEDERAL INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE, AND Ro-
DENTICIDE ACT (FIFRA) 1 (Univ. Mich. Center for Sustainable Systems 2003), available
at http://css.snre.umich.edu/css-doc/FIFRA.pdf.
206 Id.
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and any necessary limitations. 2° 7 These restrictions can also be
amended and modified as the EPA sees fit. If the user fails to comply
with the requirements on the label, he or she will be subject to
penalties.
There are numerous sanctions available for violations of the con-
ditions imposed by FIFRA, and the EPA and state agencies are actively
engaged in dealing with such violations. FIFRA requires that all pesti-
cides be registered and the EPA maintains ultimate authority over the
enforcement of the statute. 20 8 The EPA allows state agencies to par-
ticipate in the enforcement of FIFRA only when the state has a feder-
ally approved pesticide program.
The law already provides for the punishment of those who inap-
propriately use FIFRA-regulated pesticides. Punishments inhere for
violations such as distributing or selling misbranded or adulterated
pesticides, altering or defacing FIFRA-approved labels, and failing to
comply with inspection and reporting requirements. 20 9 These viola-
tions are subject to both civil and criminal penalties and can range
from fines of $5000 to $50,000 and up to three years imprisonment. 210
History has shown that the EPA is willing to punish FIFRA viola-
tors harshly. For example, in September 2002, the EPA settled with
Micro Flo, an alleged FIFRA violator, for a civil penalty of
$1,053,858.21 1 Micro Flo was a pesticide manufacturer charged with
selling pesticides that differed in composition from the approved ver-
sion and for dealing with unapproved producers. 212 Although this
amount may not be a typical fine for a FIFRA violation, 213 it demon-
strates the potential impact that FIFRA can have.
FIFRA would have similar effects in cases discussed in this Note.
For instance, because the product used in the Headwaters case was not
used in the appropriate manner, the users have violated FIFRA and
could face sanctions from the EPA. 2 14 The label warned that MAGNA-
207 Id. at 2.
208 Id. at 1.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Signs Consent Agreement and
Final Order with Micro Flo, LLC to Settle FIFRA Violations (Sept. 19, 2002), available
at http://www.epa.gov/region4/oeapages/O2press/09-19-02.htm.
212 Id.
213 This amount was the second largest penalty assessed by the EPA under FIFRA.
Id. More typical penalties seem to be in the $2000-$8000 range. See U.S. ENVrL.
PROT. AGENCY, ENFORCEMENT ACTION SUMMARY FisctL YEAR 2000: FEDERAL INSE(7r-
CIDE, FUNGICIDE, AND RODENTICIDE (FIFRA) (2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/
region5/orc/enfactions/enfactions2000/law-fifra.htm.
214 See discussion supra notes 112-30 and accompanying text.
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CIDE H needed to be used carefully and only under certain circum-
stances because of the adverse effects it would have on fish.2 15
Because the pesticide was not used appropriately, a fine should be
levied against defendants. They should not, however, be expected to
obtain a NPDES permit under the CWA, thus subjecting them to addi-
tional regulation. Those who use pesticides in the appropriate man-
ner and in compliance with FIFRA should be free from liability.
C. Who Should Overrule Forsgren ?
The Forsgren decision could effectively be overruled by any one of
a number of federal actors, or alternatively by a combination of many
of them. Potential candidates include the Supreme Court of the
United States, Congress, and the EPA. The EPA has already had a
hand in finding a solution by preparing its Interim Statement on this
issue. 216 A final declaration by the EPA may not be enough, however,
to settle the dispute. 217 Thus, either the Supreme Court or Congress
may have to throw its hat in the ring to affirmatively establish the prin-
ciple that pesticides used in compliance with FIFRA should not re-
quire NPDES permits under the CWA.
Some individuals and groups want the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari and review the Forsgren decision. In fact, because there is
such great concern over this issue, a group of bipartisan lawmakers
petitioned Attorney General John Ashcroft to seek such a Supreme
Court review.218 The petition was signed by twenty-eight Senators,
and numerous House members were signatories of a companion let-
ter. 219 The lawmakers were concerned about the potentially broad
consequences of the Forsgren decision and said " It] his ruling will have
enormous implications for the health of our public and private forests
and for innumerable beneficial pest control [initiatives] nation-
wide." 220 The basis for the concern is that requiring permits for activi-
ties such as mosquito and moth control, which are often time-critical
endeavors, could lead to impermissible delay.221 Additionally, farmers
215 See BAKER PETROLITE CORP., supra note 116, at 4; Hamel, supra note 115.
MAGNACIDE H is registered under FIFRA and bears an EPA-approved label. This
label warns about the potential lethal effects of this chemical but does not state that a
NPDES permit is required for its use. See supra note 115.
216 See supra notes 79-111 and accompanying text.
217 SeeWerner, supra note 180.
218 Karen L. Werner, Environment: Senate, House Members Urge Ashcroft to Seek Review
of Insecticide Spraying Case, 97 Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at A31 (May 20, 2003).
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id.
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and other pesticide users are likely to be confused as to when a
NPDES permit is needed. 222 Pesticides and insecticides are often used
for critical programs that protect our forests, crops, and human
health.223 The legislators are concerned that the Forsgren decision set
a "dangerous precedent" and should be reviewed by the Supreme
Court.
2 2 4
Other groups think an amendment to FIFRA is the appropriate
remedy for resolving this conflict.225 They are also concerned about
the broad potential reach of the Forsgren decision and recognize that
it could have ramifications for things like chemicals used to clean up
oil spills, agricultural interests, and pest control. 226 These constitu-
ents believe that EPA guidance on the issue may not be sufficient to
end the confusion and the accompanying litigation. Representative
John Duncan supports the idea of amending FIFRA. 227 His staff direc-
tor and senior counsel, Susan Bodine, suggested that EPA guidance
would articulate how the agency interprets the law but that cases
would still be brought, with plaintiffs arguing for another interpreta-
tion.228 Recognizing the possible inadequacies of EPA rulemaking or
guidance, an amendment to FIFRA is a viable option. Amendment of
FIFRA is preferable to an amendment of the CWA because FIFRA is
likely to be amended in the near future for the ratification of the
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. 229 It may be
best to address this issue by coupling the proposed amendment with a
more popular and well-accepted initiative because some argue that
"stand alone legislation on the topic does not stand a chance." 230 If
the CWA/FIFRA overlap issue were included in this amendment, then
there would be no more confusion about which law should govern.
Of the three alternatives-EPA guidance, Supreme Court review,
or a legislative fix-there is no clear winner as to which would best
address the issue. Final EPA guidance would more clearly state the
agency's position on this matter. Naturally, this position would be en-
titled to deference, 231 but there is reason to believe that some would
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 See Werner, supra note 180.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id
229 Id.
230 See id. (citing Rep. Dennis Cardoza and acknowledging that it may be best for
the overlap issue to go "under the radar").
231 See Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 531 (9th Cir. 2001)
(citing Res. Inv., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 151 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir.
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argue for a different interpretation. 232 Alternatively, Supreme Court
review, and subsequent reversal, of the Forsgren decision would estab-
lish a valuable precedent for lower courts and provide guidance as to
how similar pesticide cases should be decided in the future. Such a
fix, however, may not be the end of the conflict. As in other facets of
the law, attorneys would argue that their case could be distinguished
from Forsgren and would require the application of a different stan-
dard. Finally, a clearly articulated statutory amendment could provide
adequate guidance for courts, pesticide users, and environmentalists.
Yet, if this amendment to FIFRA needs to go "under the radar, '' 233 as
suggested above, its reception would likely be controversial. Ideally,
the best solution would be for the Supreme Court, the EPA, and the
legislature to all take these steps, thus presenting a united front.
CONCLUSION
The Forsgren decision has led to a great deal of uncertainty for
those who use pesticides. The holding declared that pesticides that
are applied to U.S. waters are subject to NPDES permitting require-
ments, yet the court reached this conclusion by assuming that such
pesticides are considered "pollutants" under the CWA. Based on the
guidance issued by the EPA, it appears that such a conclusion is un-
founded. Despite this criticism from the EPA, the Forsgren decision
remains in effect and could potentially have broad ramifications.
The decision impacts those engaged in activities such as irriga-
tion, farming, and disease prevention. In the irrigation business, for
instance, herbicides are used to remove vegetation from the irrigation
canals, thereby ensuring an adequate supply of water can be delivered
to the crops and flood damage can be minimized. 234 As this example
illustrates, chemicals such as herbicides and pesticides perform nu-
merous beneficial functions and often ultimately protect human
health and safety. When such products are used for their intended
purpose and in compliance with FIFRA, they should not be subject to
NPDES permitting requirements.
We do not want these critical activities to be delayed or poten-
tially stopped. We need fire control and we need mosquito eradica-
1998), which noted that "an agency's construction of a statute it is charged with en-
forcing is normally entitled to deference if it is reasonable and not in conflict with the
expressed intent of Congress").
232 See Werner, supra note 180 (noting that some individuals suspect that EPA
guidance will not be sufficient to put an end to the dispute).
233 Id. (quoting Rep. Dennis Cardoza).
234 Hamel, supra note 115.
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tion efforts. Potentially, if entities stopped performing these
functions because of the need to obtain a permit, water quality could
actually be impaired-a result that nobody wants.
NPDES permits are not free. As such, all pesticide users will be
expected to face these increased costs in order to undertake activities
that have traditionally not been subject to such a requirement.
NPDES permits should be reserved for the disposal of, unwanted
wastes and should not apply to activities that are beneficial and
useful. 235
People who use pesticides are still subject to fines if they violate
the conditions imposed by FIFRA. Thus, those who use pesticides
inappropriately will be punished. For instance, because the product
used in the Headwaters case was not used in the appropriate manner, a
substantial fine should be imposed. Those who use pesticides in the
appropriate manner, however, and by doing so promote human
health and safety, should not be punished.
FIFRA is the appropriate statute to govern the use of pesticides.
The CWA should not be used in this capacity. Whether it comes from
the EPA, the Supreme Court, or the Legislature, we need some au-
thority to clearly articulate this stance.
235 See id.
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